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Decoding square-free Goppa codes over Fp
Paulo S. L. M. Barreto, Rafael Misoczki, and Richard Lindner
Abstract—We propose a new, efficient non-deterministic de-
coding algorithm for square-free Goppa codes over Fp for any
prime p. If the code in question has degree t and the average
distance to the closest codeword is at least (4/p)t+1, the proposed
decoder can uniquely correct up to (2/p)t errors with high
probability. The correction capability is higher if the distribution
of error magnitudes is not uniform, approaching or reaching t
errors when any particular error value occurs much more often
than others or exclusively. This makes the method interesting
for (semantically secure) cryptosystems based on the decoding
problem for permuted and punctured Goppa codes.
Index Terms—Algorithms, Cryptography, Decoding, Error cor-
rection
I. Introduction
PUBLIC-KEY cryptosystems based on coding theory,known for nearly as long as the very concept of asymmet-
ric cryptography itself, have recently been attracting renewed
interest because of their apparent resistance even against
attacks mounted with the help of quantum computers, consti-
tuting a family of so-called post-quantum cryptosystems [1].
However, not all error-correcting codes are suitable for cryp-
tographic applications. The most commonly used family of
codes for such purposed is that of Goppa codes, which
remain essentially unharmed by cryptanalysis efforts despite
considerable efforts and progress in the area.
Introduced in 1970, Goppa codes [2] are a subfamily of
alternant codes, i.e. subfield subcodes of Generalized Reed-
Solomon codes. Let q = pm for some prime p and some m > 0.
A Goppa code Γ(L, g) over Fp is determined by a sequence
L ∈ Fnq of distinct values, and a polynomial g ∈ Fq[x] of degree
t := deg(g) whose roots are disjoint from L. Goppa codes have
by design a minimal distance at least t + 1 by virtue of being
alternant. Certain codes are known to have better minimum
distances than this lower bound. Thus, binary Goppa codes
where g is square-free are known to have a larger minimum
distance of at least 2t + 1 instead. A family of codes where g
is not square-free have minimum distance at least t+ γ− 1 for
some 2 < γ < t − 1, which is known as the Hartmann-Tzeng
bound for Goppa codes [3], [4].
The class of Sugiyama-Kasahara-Hirasawa-Namekawa
codes [5] where g = hr−1 for some square-free monic poly-
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nomial h ∈ Fq[x] and some power r of p dividing q, which
constitute a proper superclass of the so-called “wild” codes
where h is restricted to being irreducible [6], have minimum
distance at least r deg(h) + 1 rather than (r − 1) deg(h) + 1.
Although it is known that the minimum distance of a Goppa
code of degree t is at least t + 1 and there are known cases
where it is higher (up to 2t + 1, as it happens for binary
square-free Goppa codes), systematically determining the true
minimum distance of any given subfamily of Goppa codes
remains largely an open problem, yet it is an important metric
as it determines not only how many errors can always be
uniquely corrected, but indirectly the security level and the
key sizes of the cryptosystems based on each given code.
Apart from brute force, known decoding methods for alter-
nant codes can in general correct only about half as many
errors as a binary square-free Goppa code is in principle
able to correct [7], [8] (see also [9]). Even the Guruswami-
Sudan algorithm [10], which exceeds the t/2 limit, can only
correct about n − √n(n − t) ≈ t/2 + (t/2)2/(2n − t) errors. In
contrast, Patterson’s algorithm can correct all t design errors
of binary Goppa codes, as can an alternant decoder using the
equivalence Γ(L, g) = Γ(L, g2) albeit at a larger computational
cost. Bernstein’s list decoding method [11] goes somewhat
further, attaining a correction capability of n−√n(n − 2t − 2) ≈
t + 1+ (t+ 1)2/2(n− t − 1) errors for binary irreducible Goppa
codes, although decoding is ambiguous if the actual distance is
not proportionally higher. Similar techniques can in principle
correct about n− √n(n − rt) ≈ rt/2+(rt/2)2/(2n−rt) errors for
wild codes [6]. Bernstein’s method does not reach the q-ary
Johnson radius, but a more recent algorithm by Augot et al.
does so in the binary case [12].
A. Our Results
Our contribution in this paper is a non-deterministic de-
coding algorithm for square-free Goppa codes over Fp for any
prime p. The method generalizes Patterson’s approach and can
potentially correct up to (2/p)t errors, on the condition that a
suitable short vector can be found in a certain polynomial
lattice. In particular, our method corrects (2/3)t errors in
characteristic 3, exceeding the t/2 barrier when the average
distance to the closest codeword is at least (4/3)t + 1. In
experiments conducted to assess the practical behaviour of
our proposal, the result of the decoding is observed to be
unique with overwhelming probability for irreducible ternary
Goppa codes chosen uniformly at random, hinting that, for
the vast majority of such codes, the average distance to
the closest codeword is sufficiently higher than the ensured
minimum distance. Besides, our proposal can probabilistically
correct a still larger number of errors that approaches and
2reaches t depending on the distribution of error magnitudes.
For instance, the method corrects up to t errors with high
probability if all error magnitudes are known to be equal.
This feature outperforms even Sugiyama-Kasahara-
Hirasawa-Namekawa and wild codes and the associated
decoding methods, and is particularly interesting for
cryptographic applications like McEliece encryption [13]
under the Fujisaki-Okamoto or similar semantic security
transform [14], where error magnitudes can be chosen by
convention to be all equal. In that case, even if an attacker
could somehow derive a generic alternant decoder from
the public code that is typical in such systems (a strategy
exploited e.g. in [15]), he will not be able to correct more
than about t/2 errors out of roughly t that can be corrected
with the private trapdoor enabled by our proposal, facing
an infeasible workload of about (p − 1)
(
n
t/2
)
/
(
t
t/2
)
guesses to
mount a complete attack. This makes Goppa codes in odd
characteristic, which have already been shown to sport some
potential security advantages over binary ones [16], even
more attractive in practice.
For the benefit of implementors, we describe a dedicated
version of the Mulders-Storjohann algorithm to convert the
particular lattice basis encountered during the decoding pro-
cess to weak Popov form. The computational complexity of
this step is then shown to be O(p3t2).
B. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. We
provide basic notions in Section II. We recapitulate Patterson’s
decoding algorithm for binary irreducible Goppa codes in Sec-
tion III, and extend it to square-free codes in characteristic p
in Section IV, showing that it can correct (2/p)t errors in
general and up to t errors depending on the distribution of
error magnitudes. We conclude in Section V.
II. Preliminaries
Matrix indices will start from 0 throughout this paper, unless
otherwise stated. Let p be a prime and let q = pm for some
m > 0. The finite field of q elements is written Fq. For
sequences of elements (g1, . . . , gt) ∈ Ftq, (L0, . . . , Ln−1) ∈ Fnq
and (d0, . . . , dn−1) ∈ Fnq for some t, n ∈ N, we denote by
toep(g1, . . . , gt) the t × t Toeplitz matrix with elements Ti j :=
gt−i+ j for j 6 i and Ti j := 0 otherwise; by vdmt(L0, . . . , Ln−1)
the t × n Vandermonde matrix with elements Vi j := Lij,
0 6 i < t, 0 6 j < n; and by diag(d0, . . . , dn−1) the diagonal
matrix with diagonal elements D j j := d j, 0 6 j < n.
A. Error Correcting Codes
Let L = (L0, . . . , Ln−1) ∈ Fnq be a sequence (called the
support) of n 6 q distinct elements, and let g ∈ Fq[x] be an
irreducible monic polynomial of degree t such that g(Li) , 0
for all i. For any word e ∈ Fnp we define the corresponding
Goppa syndrome polynomial se ∈ Fq[x] to be:
se(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
ei
x − Li
mod g(x).
Thus the syndrome is a linear function of e. The [n,> n −
mt,> t+ 1] Goppa code over Fp with support L and generator
polynomial g is the kernel of the syndrome function applied
to elements from Fp, i.e. the set Γ(L, g) := {e ∈ Fnp | se ≡ 0
mod g}.
Writing se(x) := ∑i si xi for some s ∈ Ftq, one can show that
sT = HeT where the parity-check matrix H has the form
H = toep(g1, . . . , gt)
· vdmt(L0, . . . Ln−1)
· diag(g(L0)−1, . . . , g(Ln−1)−1)
(1)
Thus H = TVD ∈ Ft×nq , where T ∈ Ft×tq is a Toeplitz matrix,
V ∈ Ft×nq is a Vandermonde matrix, and D ∈ Fn×nq is a diagonal
matrix.
Since a Goppa code is a Fp-subfield subcode, it is possible
to express the syndrome function in terms of a parity-check
matrix ¯H ∈ Fmt×np using the so-called trace construction (see
e.g. [9, Ch. 7, § 7]). This is useful to obtain a syndrome
s¯ ∈ Fmtp equivalent to s ∈ Ftq above while keeping the
arithmetic operations in Fp rather than Fq, even though it is not
immediately useful for decoding, at which point a syndrome
over Fq has to be assembled by inverting the trace construction.
The syndrome decoding problem consists of computing the
error pattern e given its syndrome se. Knowledge of the code
structure in the form of the support L and the polynomial g
makes this problem solvable in polynomial time, with some
constraints relating the weight of e to the degree of g.
B. Polynomial Lattices
Let A ∈ Fq[x]n×m be a polynomial matrix, and let r denote
its rank (i.e. assume that A has r linearly independent rows).
The (polynomial) lattice Λ(A) over Fq[x] spanned by the rows
of A is
Λ(A) = {(u0, . . . , un−1)A ∈ Fq[x]m | (u0, . . . , un−1) ∈ Fq[x]n}.
The notion of length which we will use for f ∈ Fq[x] is | f | =
deg( f ). For polynomial vectors v ∈ Fq[x]n we adopt the notion
of maximal degree length: |v| = maxi |vi|. This notion is coarse
enough that, contrary to integer lattices where finding even an
approximation to the shortest vector by a constant factor is a
hard problem [17], reducing a basis for a polynomial lattice
can be achieved in polynomial time. The following result by
Mulders and Storjohann holds [18]:
Theorem 1. There exists an algorithm which finds the shortest
nonzero vector in the Fq[x]-module generated by the rows of
A with O(mnrd2) operations in Fq, where d = max{deg(Ai j) |
1 6 i 6 n, 6 j 6 m}.
The algorithm whose existence is established by Theorem 1
is based on converting a given lattice basis to the so-called
weak Popov form, formally defined in Appendix A, which also
contains a description of Algorithm 2 and its cost behavior in
the context of decoding.
The weak Popov form is not the only way to find short
vectors in a polynomial lattice, and in fact this is not critical to
our proposal in this paper; for instance, the method by Lee and
O’Sullivan [19], which is related to Gröbner bases, would ap-
pear to be an alternative. Our choice of the Mulders-Storjohann
3method, which computes the weak Popov form, derives from
its conceptual simplicity and ease of implementation, since the
result turns out to be a natural generalization of Patterson’s
decoding algorithm described in the next section.
III. Patterson’s DecodingMethod
We briefly recapitulate Patterson’s decoding algorithm [20],
which will provide the basis for the general algorithm we
propose. The goal, of course, is to compute the error pattern
e given its syndrome se and the structure of Γ(L, g).
Let q = 2m, and assume we are given a binary Goppa code
Γ(L, g) where the monic polynomial g is irreducible. We define
the Patterson locator polynomial σ ∈ Fq[x] as:
σ(x) :=
∏
ei=1
(x − Li). (2)
The name locator polynomial comes from the fact that the
roots of σ clearly indicate where errors occurred, since
σ(L j) = 0 ⇔ e j = 1. Taking the derivative of the formal
power series underlying σ, we obtain
σ′(x) =
∑
ei=1
∏
e j=1
j,i
(x − L j)
=
∑
ei=1
1
x − Li
∏
e j=1
(x − L j)
= σ(x)
∑
i
ei
x − Li
,
and hence, in Fq[x]/g(x),
σ′(x) = σ(x)se(x) mod g(x). (3)
This is called the key equation, and now we discuss how to
solve it.
Being a polynomial in characteristic 2, σ(x) modulo g(x)
can be written as
σ(x) = a0(x)2 + xa1(x)2
for some a0(x), a1(x) with deg(a0) 6 ⌊t/2⌋ and deg(a1) 6
⌊(t − 1)/2⌋, and hence
σ′(x) = 2 a0(x) a′0(x) + a1(x)2 + 2 a1(x) a′1(x) x = a1(x)2,
since the characteristic is 2. Therefore
a1(x)2 = σ′(x) = σ(x)se(x)
=
(
a0(x)2 + xa1(x)2
)
se(x) mod g(x),
whence
a0(x) = a1(x)v(x) mod g(x) (4)
where v(x) is a polynomial satisfying v(x)2 = x + 1/se(x)
mod g(x). Such a polynomial surely exists in characteristic 2
if g(x) is square-free: if g(x) = ∏i gi(x) where each gi(x) is
irreducible, then v(x) mod gi(x) can be computed as a square
root of x+1/se(x) mod gi(x) viewed as an element of the finite
field Fq[x]/gi(x), and v(x) mod g(x) can then be obtained by
combining the results via the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
We can thus assume that deg(v) < t = deg(g).
The last equation is actually a Bézout relation a0(x) =
a1(x)v(x) + λ(x)g(x), which can be solved for a0(x) and a1(x)
with the restriction deg(a j) 6 ⌊(t− j)/2⌋ (and also λ(x) but it is
not used) using the extended Euclidean algorithm. Solutions
(a0, a1) can also be seen as short vectors in the lattice spanned
by the rows of the following matrix:
A =
[
g 0
v 1
]
in the sense that the degrees of these polynomials are much
smaller than uniformly random vectors, since (λ, a1)A = (λg+
a1v, a1) = (a0, a1) for some λ ∈ Fq[x], by virtue of Equation 4.
Therefore, Algorithm 2 can be used to find candidate solutions
(a0, a1).
At first glance there is no guarantee that a short vector in
the lattice generated by A yields the desired solution; in other
words, being short is a necessary condition, but in principle
not a sufficient one. However, the fact that in the binary case
the minimum code distance is known [2] to be at least 2t + 1
actually restricts σ to a single candidate, so that Algorithm 2
is bound to find it. Thus, decoding is always successful up to
t introduced errors.
IV. Decoding Codes over Fp
We now show how to generalize Patterson’s decoding al-
gorithm so as to correct errors for codes defined over general
prime fields. Thus, let q = pm for some prime p and some
m > 0, and assume we are given an irreducible Goppa code
Γ(L, g) over Fp.
Let φ ∈ Fp \ {0} be a constant scalar. We define the
generalized error locator polynomial to be
σφ(x) :=
∏
i
(x − Li)ei/φ (5)
where the value ei/φ is lifted from Fp to Z (i.e. the value
ei/φ ∈ Fp that occurs as an exponent is taken to mean its
corresponding least non-negative integer representative, which
lies in range 0 . . . p−1). One can easily see that this definition
actually coincides with Patterson error locator polynomials as
defined by Equation 2 for p = 2. Lifting Equation 5 to the
field of rational functions in characteristic 0 and taking the
derivative, we have
σ′φ(x) =
∑
j
(e j/φ)(x − L j)e j/φ−1
∏
i, j
(x − Li)ei/φ
= (1/φ)
∑
j
e j
x − L j
∏
i
(x − Li)ei/φ
= (1/φ)σφ(x)
∑
j
e j
x − L j
,
which over Fq[x] reduces to
φσ′φ(x) = σφ(x)se(x) mod g(x). (6)
This is the φ-th key equation of the proposed method, which
generalizes Equation 3 to Goppa codes over Fp. The actual φ
must be chosen so as to minimize the degree of σφ (and hence
maximize the number of correctable errors). One cannot expect
to know a priori the value of φ, but since there are only p− 1
4possibilities, the error correction strategy will be to try each
of them in turn.
Notice that the maximum number of correctable errors can
be, and usually is, less than t, since the degree of σφ exceeds
the number of roots in the presence of multiple roots. The
following theorem provides an upper bound for how many
errors can be corrected by solving Equation 6 when the
distribution of error magnitudes is not taken into account.
Theorem 2. The maximum number of errors that can be cor-
rected by solving Equation 6 independently of the distribution
of error magnitudes is w = (2/p)t.
Proof: Let wv denote the number of times the magnitude
v occurs in an error pattern of weight w, so that
∑
v wv = w.
Since we are working with a Goppa code, the constraint for
correctability is deg(σφ) = ∑v (v/φ)wv 6 t. In the extreme
situation when the weight of the error pattern reaches w, the
most often error magnitude occurs wmax > w/(p − 1) times,
attaining the lower bound when all error magnitudes occur
with equal frequency. In that case, deg(σφ) 6 ∑v (v/φ)wmax =
(1+2+ · · ·+ (p−1))w/(p−1) = wp/2 6 t, and hence no more
than errors than w = (2/p)t can be corrected independently of
the distribution of magnitudes, as claimed.
Since the proposed method coincides with Patterson’s for
p = 2, it is not surprising that t errors can be corrected in that
case. However, in characteristic 3 the number of potentially
correctable errors is (2/3)t, non-deterministically exceeding
the limit of t/2 errors attainable by previously known decoding
methods for codes of degree t, except in the case of so called
“wild codes” [6] whereby the Goppa polynomial is a (p−1)-th
power of an irreducible polynomial (our method, by contrast,
applies when that polynomial is square-free, as we will see in
Section IV-A).
Despite the low general limit of (2/p)t correctable errors
for p > 3, it is still possible to exceed that limit in any
odd characteristic if the distribution of error magnitudes is
unbalanced. Indeed, all that is required to get a chance of
uniquely decoding a word containing w 6 t errors is that
deg(σφ) 6 t for some choice of φ and that the actual distance
from the right codeword to any other codeword be at least
2w + 1.
The actual number of correctable errors depends heavily on
the distribution of error magnitudes and has to be computed
in a case-by-case basis, always laying in the range (2/p)t to
t. In particular, if all error magnitudes are equal, in principle
one could correct t errors, even though this is a statistical
rather than deterministic behavior. This is especially use-
ful for cryptographic applications involving an all-or-nothing
transform [21], as it happens e.g. for a semantically secure
encryption scheme involving the McEliece one-way trapdoor
function [13] and the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [14]. In
such scenarios, the magnitudes of the introduced errors can be
chosen to be all or nearly all equal by convention, making the
proposed decoder attractive for its higher decodability bound,
under the explicit assumption that decoding them remains
hard.
A. Solving the Key Equation
We now focus on actually solving Equation 6. Being a
polynomial in characteristic p, σφ(x) can be written as
σφ(x) =
p−1∑
k=0
xkak(x)p (7)
for some ak(x) with deg(ak) 6 ⌊(t − k)/p⌋, 0 6 k 6 p − 1, and
hence
σ′φ(x) =
p−1∑
k=0
(
kxk−1ak(x)p + pxkak(x)p−1a′k(x)
)
=
p−1∑
k=1
kxk−1ak(x)p
since the characteristic is p. Therefore
φ
p−1∑
k=1
kxk−1ak(x)p = φσ′φ(x) = σφ(x)se(x)
=

p−1∑
k=0
xkak(x)p
 se(x) mod g(x),
whence
a0 +
p−1∑
k=1
ak(x)vk(x) = 0 mod g(x) (8)
where the vk(x) are polynomials satisfying vk(x)p = xk −
φkxk−1/se(x) mod g(x). Such polynomials surely exist in
characteristic p if g(x) is square-free: if g(x) =∏i gi(x) where
each gi(x) is irreducible, then vk(x) mod gi(x) can be computed
as a p-th root of xk − φkxk−1/se(x) mod gi(x) viewed as an
element of the finite field Fq[x]/gi(x), and vk(x) mod g(x) can
then be obtained by combining the results via the Chinese
Remainder Theorem. We can thus assume that deg(vk) < t =
deg(g).
The Diophantine equation 8 has to be solved for ak(x)
with the stated restriction on their degrees. Solutions
(a0, a1, . . . , ap−1) can be seen as short vectors in the lattice
spanned by the rows of the matrix
Aφ =

g 0 0 . . . 0
−v1 1 0 . . . 0
−v2 0 1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
−vp−1 0 0 . . . 1

, (9)
since, by virtue of Equation 8, one has (λ, a1, . . . , ap−1)Aφ =
(λg − ∑p−1k=1 ak(x)vk(x), a1, . . . , ap−1) = (a0, a1, . . . , ap−1) for
some λ ∈ Fq[x]. Therefore, Algorithm 2 can be used to find
candidate solutions (a0, . . . , ap−1).
The method is applicable whenever one can actually invert
s mod g and then compute the p-roots needed to define the
vk polynomials. This is always the case when g is irreducible,
but not exclusively so. Indeed, to compute the vk it suffices
that g is square-free and that s is invertible modulo each of
the irreducible factors of g, since in this case the vk can be
easily computed modulo those irreducible factors and finally
recovered via the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Theorem 1 ensures a cost not exceeding O(p3t2) Fq opera-
tions for computing short vectors in Λ(Aφ).
5B. Estimating the Success Probability
Regrettably the ability to find shorts vectors in lattice Λ(Aφ)
does not mean that any such vector yields a solution to
Equation 6. We will now see that, fortunately, the proposed
method has a surprisingly favourable probability of finding the
right (a0, . . . , ap−1) that solves Equation 6.
As a cautionary note, we stress that a full theoretical
analysis of the failure probability remains, to the best of our
knowledge, an open problem. Because the distance notion here
is not Euclidean, but rather that of Hamming, Minkowski’s
theorem on the existence of a lattice point in any large
enough convex set does not appear to apply in our case.
Also, the analysis would also appear to require a detailed
theory on the distribution of the average distance between
a vector and the closest codeword whose magnitudes satisfy
some constraint (like being all equal, or following a highly
skewed distribution), which to the best of our knowledge is
too an open problem. As a consequence, the failure probability
estimates we provide are conjectured on an empirical basis.
Namely, they result from experiments conducted on a large
number of random Goppa codes at which our decoding method
is targeted, and for each of those codes, on a large number
of decoding attempts on random error patterns following the
particular magnitude constraint (equal for all error positions)
for which the decoder works best.
In a successful decoding, the reduced basis for lattice Λ(Aφ)
leads to candidates for σφ with degree t onward, of which
of course only the candidate with the smallest degree is the
correct one. Spurious candidates of degree close to t result
from random-looking short (albeit not shortest) vectors in the
reduced basis and are usually harmless. But the fact that those
short vectors are “random-looking” means they are also a
threat: if by chance they are such that the coefficient of the
highest-degree term in the associated spurious σφ vanishes,
deg(σφ) becomes t or less. Since this is connected with the
vanishing of a coefficient from Fq, this event happens with
probability 1/q assuming that short spurious vectors in Λ(Aφ)
are approximately uniformly distributed.
In general, when trying to correct w < t errors of equal
magnitude for a uniformly random irreducible Goppa code,
the top t+1−w coefficients in the spurious σφ must vanish to
interfere with the decoding process, whence the probability of
successful decoding is roughly 1− 1/qt+1−w. This matches the
empirically observed behaviour of the proposed method in odd
characteristic. Not surprisingly, the method always succeeds
for binary codes, since it reduces to Patterson’s algorithm and
the minimum code distance is known to be at least 2t + 1.
Table I illustrates the results of experiments in Magma [22]
supporting the conjecture that the probability of successful
decoding is roughly Prsuc := 1 − 1/qt+1−w. For each quadruple
(p,m, t,w), a set of 10000 Goppa codes of maximum length
n = pm and degree t plus an error pattern of length n,
weight w and all magnitudes equal (to a single random
value in Fp \ {0}) were randomly generated, and the proposed
method was then applied to decode the syndrome of that error
pattern. The predicted number of successful decodings, Npre,
is then compared with the actually observed number Nobs of
successful decodings. For each combination of p and m, the
first listed t is the largest integer satisfying pm − mt > 0.
The number w of introduced errors in then decreased starting
from t until the probability of success exceeds 0.9999. Since
Prsuc is close to 1 for large q, reasonably small values are
chosen for all parameters so that the probability of decoding
failure is large enough to be easily discernible. This is also
the reason why more detail is provided for smaller parameters.
We omit the results for characteristic 2, since in all tests we
conducted no decoding failure was observed, as expected. We
stress that these examples are not meant by any means for
practical cryptographic use.
TABLE I
Experimental assessment of the probability of decoding success
p m t w Prsuc Npre Nobs
3 3 8 8 0.962963 9630 9670
3 3 8 7 0.998628 9986 9992
3 3 8 6 0.999949 9999 9999
3 3 7 7 0.962963 9630 9639
3 3 7 6 0.998628 9986 9989
3 3 7 5 0.999949 9999 10000
3 3 6 6 0.962963 9630 9645
3 3 6 5 0.998628 9986 9991
3 3 6 4 0.999949 9999 10000
3 4 20 20 0.987654 9877 9883
3 4 20 19 0.999848 9998 9997
3 4 20 18 0.999998 10000 10000
5 2 12 12 0.960000 9600 9612
5 2 12 11 0.998400 9984 9985
5 2 12 10 0.999936 9999 10000
5 3 41 41 0.992000 9920 9924
5 3 41 40 0.999936 9999 10000
7 2 24 24 0.997085 9971 9989
7 2 24 23 0.999992 9999 10000
11 2 60 60 0.991736 9917 9922
11 2 60 59 0.999932 9999 9999
Decoding w 6 (2/p)t errors of uniformly random magnitude
for a uniformly random irreducible code is of course always
successful for p > 3, since in that case w does not exceed
half the minimum code distance, which is at least t + 1 >
(4/p)t + 1 > 2w + 1.
C. Computing the Error Magnitudes
In contrast to generic alternant decoding methods, there is
no need to compute an error evaluator polynomial to obtain
the error magnitudes in the current proposal. After obtaining
σφ(x) and finding its roots L j, all that is needed to compute the
corresponding error values e j is to determine the multiplicity
µ j of each root, since one can see from Equation 5 that e j =
φµ j.
Computing µ j is accomplished by determining how many
times (x − L j) | σφ(x) whenever σφ(L j) = 0, or alternatively
by finding the highest derivative of σφ such that σ(h)φ (L j) = 0
(and setting µ j ← h).
Since the value of φ is not known a priori, and even in
scenarios where it is actually known beforehand, an additional
6syndrome check is necessary for each guessed φ, and the
process usually must check all possible values of φ anyway
since more than one solution may exist.
D. The Completed Decoder
We are finally ready to state the full decoding method
explicitly in Algorithm 1. It can be seen as a list decoding algo-
rithm with possible failures. The polynomial decomposition of
Equation 7 immediately suggests a simple and efficient way to
compute the p-th roots needed at Step 9, namely, precompute
r(x) ← p√x mod g(x) and r(x)k mod g(x), and then compute
the p-th root of z(x) := ∑k xkzk(x)p as p√z(x) mod g(x) ←∑
k r(x)kzk(x). The test in Step 2 is unnecessary if g is
irreducible. To find the zeroes of σφ in Step 21 one can use the
Chien search technique [23], in which case the multiplicities
of each root can be determined as part of the search, or the
Berlekamp trace algorithm [24].
V. Conclusion
We described a new decoding algorithm for square-free
(in particular, irreducible) Goppa codes of degree t over Fp
that can correct (2/p)t errors in general, and up to t errors
for certain distributions of error magnitudes of cryptographic
interest. By attaining an correction capability of (2/3)t errors
in characteristic 3 with high probability, our method out-
performs the best previously known decoder for that case,
and suggests that the corresponding average distance to the
closest codeword is at least (4/3)t + 1 for most irreducible
ternary Goppa codes. Regardless of the characteristic, our
proposal can correct a still larger number of errors that
approaches (and probabilistically reaches) t as the distribution
of error magnitudes becomes ever more skewed toward the
predominance of some individual value. The method can be
viewed as generalizing Patterson’s binary decoding procedure,
and is similarly efficient in practice.
A further increase in the number of correctable errors may
be possible by resorting to list decoding and by extracting
more information from the decoding process along the lines
proposed by Bernstein [11]. This in principle might enable
the correction of approximately n −
√
n(n − (4/p)t) errors in
general, and possibly as many as n − √n(n − 2t − 2) errors
depending on the distribution of error magnitudes. Further-
more, the ability to correct close to t errors with high prob-
ability means that smaller keys might be adopted for coding-
based cryptosystems. Properly chosen parameters would keep
the probability of decoding failure below the probability of
breaking the resulting schemes by random guessing, while
maintaining the security at the desired level. We leave the
investigation of such possibilities for future research.
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Appendix A
TheWeak Popov Form
For ease of reference, we provide here a concise description
of the Mulders-Storjohann polynomial lattice reduction algo-
rithm based on the weak Popov form. We closely follow the
exposition in [18], while attempting to make our description
more implementation-friendly.
Definition 1. For 1 6 i 6 n the i-th pivot index vector IM of
a matrix M ∈ Fq[x]n×m is defined as follows: if Mi j = 0 for all
1 6 j 6 m, then IMi = 0, otherwise
1) deg(Mi j) 6 deg(Mi,IMi ) for 1 6 j < IMi ,
2) deg(Mi j) < deg(Mi,IMi ) for IMi < j 6 m.
Definition 2. The carrier set CM of a matrix M ∈ Fq[x]n×m
is the set {1 6 i 6 n | IMi , 0}. The i-th pivot element of
M, denoted PMi , is the element PMi := Mi,IMi when I
M
i , 0,
otherwise PMi := 0.
Definition 3. A matrix M ∈ Fq[x]n×m is said to be in weak
Popov form if the positive pivot indices of M are all different,
i.e. if ∀k, ℓ ∈ CM : k , ℓ ⇒ IMk , IMℓ .
The following theorem establishes that writing a matrix in
weak Popov form yields short vectors in the lattice spanned
by its rows.
Theorem 3 ( [18]). If matrix M ∈ Fq[x]n×m is in weak Popov
form and ℓ is such that deg(PM
ℓ
) = min16i6n{deg(PMi )}, then
all vectors in the Fq[x]-module generated by the rows of M
have degree at least deg(PM
ℓ
).
Proof: See [18, Lemma 8.1].
If k ∈ CM , ℓ , k and deg(Mℓ,IMk ) > deg(PMk ), there are unique
c ∈ Fq and e ∈ N such that deg(Mℓ,IMk − cxePMk ) < deg(Mℓ,IMk ).
In that case we call the operation Mℓ ← Mℓ − cxeMk the
simple transformation of row k on row ℓ. If IM
ℓ
= IMk , the
transformation is called of the first kind. Then an efficient
algorithm to put a matrix in weak Popov form stems from the
following observation:
Theorem 4 ( [18]). M ∈ Fq[x]n×m is not in weak Popov form
iff one can apply a simple transformation of the first kind on
M, that is, not all non-zero pivot indices of M are different.
Proof: See [18, Lemma 2.1].
Therefore, all one has to do to obtain the weak Popov form
of a matrix M is to repeatedly check if M is already in the
weak Popov form (by testing if all nonzero pivot indices are
different) and, if it is not, apply a simple transformation of the
first kind on it.
This process is summarised in Algorithm 2 for a matrix in
the form of Equation 9, where n = m = p, the expected rank
is r 6 p, and the degree of all rows is bounded by d 6 t. By
Theorem 1, its complexity is O(p3t2) Fq operations at most.
Here lead(P) denotes the leading coefficient of P ∈ Fq[x] and
rep(IA) denotes the number of occurrences of the most frequent
value among the nonzero components of IA, i.e. rep(IA) :=
max{#{ j | IAj = v} | v , 0}.
Written in this form, Algorithm 2 is strikingly similar to
the modified Euclidean algorithm usually employed in the
decoding of alternant codes [8], and actually coincides with
that method for p = 2.
Algorithm 2 Computing the weak Popov form
Input: A ∈ Fq[x]p×p in the form of Equation 9.
Output: weak Popov form of A.
1: ⊲ Compute IA:
2: for j ← 1 to p do
3: IAj ← if deg(A j,1) > 0 then 1 else j
4: end for
5: ⊲ Put A in weak Popov form:
6: while rep(IA) > 1 do
7: for k ← 1 to p such that IAk , 0 do
8: for ℓ ← 1 to p such that ℓ , k do
9: while deg(Aℓ,IAk ) > deg(Ak,IAk ) do
10: c ← lead(Aℓ,IAk )/ lead(Ak,IAk )
11: e ← deg(Aℓ,IAk ) − deg(Ak,IAk )
12: Aℓ ← Aℓ − cxeAk
13: end while
14: ⊲ Update IA
ℓ
and hence rep(IA) if necessary:
15: d ← max{deg(Aℓ, j) | j = 1, . . . , p}
16: IA
ℓ
← max{ j | deg(Aℓ, j) = d}
17: end for
18: end for
19: end while
20: return A
8Appendix B
Decoding Other Families of Codes?
For completeness, we briefly discuss whether and how one
might attempt to use similar methods to decode a different
family of alternant codes, including BCH codes and their
permuted and/or punctured versions.
Let L ∈ Fnq be a sequence of n 6 q distinct nonzero
elements, let D ∈ Fnq be a sequence of nonzero elements, and
let H = vdm(L) diag(D). For any word e ∈ Fnp we define the
corresponding alternant r-syndrome polynomial se ∈ Fq[x] to
be se(x) := ∑r−1i=0 si xi where sT := HeT, i.e.
si =
n−1∑
j=0
e jD jLij.
The alternant code A(L, D, r) consists of the set {e ∈ Fnp |
se(x) ≡ 0}.
Using the formula for the sum of a geometric sequence∑r−1
i=0 u
i = (1−ur)/(1−u) whereby ∑r−1i=0 Lij xi = (1−xrLrj)/ (1−
xL j) ≡ 1/(1 − xL j) mod xr, one can see that
se(x) =
r−1∑
i=0
n−1∑
j=0
e jD jLijx
i =
n−1∑
j=0
e jD j
r−1∑
i=0
Lijx
i
≡
n−1∑
j=0
e jD j
1 − xL j
mod xr.
The subfamily we will be interested in is that of alternant
codes satisfying the restriction ξ j := D j/L j ∈ Fp \ {0} for all j,
so that each value ξ j can be lifted to Z with a representative
in range 1 . . . p − 1.
Let φ ∈ Fp \ {0} be a constant scalar. We define the
generalized error locator polynomial for this family as
σφ(x) :=
∏
i
(1 − xLi)eiξi/φ. (10)
The error positions are revealed by the inverses of the com-
ponents of L, which are the roots of this polynomial. This
definition coincides with the usual alternant error locator
polynomial when p = 2, in which case D = L (hence, a
permuted and/or punctured subcode of a binary BCH code).
Taking the derivative of the formal power series underlying
σφ in Equation 10, we get
σ′φ(x) =
∑
j
(e jξ j/φ)(1 − xL j)e jξ j/φ−1(−L j)
∏
i, j
(1 − xLi)eiξi/φ
= −(1/φ)
∑
j
e jD j
1 − xL j
∏
i
(1 − xLi)eiξi/φ
= −(1/φ)σφ(x)
∑
j
e jD j
1 − xL j
,
which over Fq[x] reduces to
− φσ′φ(x) = σφ(x)se(x) mod xr. (11)
This is the φ-th key equation for this family of codes.
Now most of the techniques developed above for Goppa
codes can be applied to solve Equation 11. The main difference
is that the error magnitudes are computed as a function of the
multiplicity µ j of a root 1/L j of σφ as e j = φµ j/ξ j.
Writing σφ(x) = ∑p−1k=0 xkak(x)p for some ak(x) with
deg(ak) 6 ⌊(r − k)/p⌋, solutions to Equation 11 can be found
as short vectors (a0, a1, . . . , ap−1) in the polynomial lattice
spanned by the rows of the matrix
Aφ =

xr 0 . . . 0
−v1 1 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
−vp−1 0 . . . 1

where the vk(x) are polynomials satisfying vk(x)p = xk −
φkxk−1/se(x) mod xr, provided that these exist.
Here the major obstacle for this technique becomes appar-
ent: inverting se(x) mod xr is usually fine, but computing the
vk(x) polynomials is only very seldom possible. Specifically,
assuming that xk − φkxk−1/se(x) mod xr are uniformly dis-
tributed polynomials in Fq[x]/xr for a random code of this
family, the probability that it is a p-th power mod xr is
only about (qr/p/qr)p−1 = p−mr(p−1)2/p, corresponding to the
vanishing of all but a fraction 1/p of the r coefficients of each
of the p − 1 polynomials needed to build matrix A.
Therefore there is scant chance that this would work in
practice, except possibly for some highly contrived code whose
syndromes lead to suitable radicands with high probability. It
is an open problem whether such codes exist and, if so, what
they might look like.
